A Critique of the Narco Judgment: A Constitutional Debate
By Piyush Kumar and Puloma Mukherjee[i]
Abstract
The Judgment of the Supreme Court on 5th May 2010 declaring the use of Narcoanalysis unconstitutional has added fuel to the long standing debate regarding the constitutionality of these methods that are used in the investigative process. This case comment seeks to examine the core of this debate and analyze the efficacy of the Judgment. In respect of the above, the scope and extent of Article 20(3) and 21 is considered along with possible infringement of Human Rights. The purpose is to try to find a balance between protecting the rights of the accused and the providing justice to the victim.
Introduction
The use of Narcoanalysis goes quite far back in the history of interrogative methods of investigation. One of the first instances of its use was by Dr. House, a Dallas Texas Obstetrician, in 1922. The suspects who claimed to be innocent by virtue of this test were acquitted and Dr. House went on to be declared the ‘Father of Truth Serum’.[ii] Since then its use in the International and National scenario went unbidden until the distant cries of the Humanitarian organizations began to hit home. It was labeled as a manner of getting around third degree means of torture and added to what were known as fruits of the poisonous tree.[iii] In India, though several High Court Judgments dealt with the constitutionality of this method, it was only in 2010 that the Supreme Court passed a judgment, Smt. Selvi and Ors. v. State of Karnataka[iv] finally declaring the same as unconstitutional. However the efficacy of such a means of interrogation and its obvious advantages cause us to once again look into this judgment and weigh these advantages against the infringement of rights caused by the use of Narcoanalysis. The entire justification given by various High Courts was based on section 27 of the Evidence Act and they have held so without properly answering the questions posed by the constitution, however in this case comment, justification given by the authors comes after answering all the questions posed by the Constitution. The piece of writing has considered in detail the infringement of Fundamental Rights under Article 20(3) and 21 as observed by the Supreme Court. Under the prior, concepts such as the .fear of prejudice’, ‘doctrine of privilege’ etc. in the light of the ‘Right to silence’ which has developed over a history of Indian judgments[v] and under the latter possible infringement of human rights along with rights such as ‘Right to privacy’, have been analyzed. Through this paper we seek to ascertain whether a balance can indeed be drawn between such a method of interrogation and the Fundamental Rights enshrined in our Constitution.
Article 20(3)
With respect to the Judgment, certain concepts need to be remembered. Firstly it is important to see how disclosure made under the influence of drug attracts debate of Article 20(3). The Apex Court has carved out three uses of revelation under drug influence viz. direct, transactional and derivative. Direct use means, findings which can be directly relied upon by the prosecution to strengthen their case by submitting the disclosure per se as evidence in a court. Transactional use means, when the information revealed can prove to be helpful for the investigation and prosecution in cases other than the one being investigated. Lastly, derivative use stands for using the fruits of revelations made under influence of the impugned tests. This essentially means that prosecution shall not rely on any revelation made by the subject of the impugned test, while undergoing the test; but when information revealed during questioning leads to the discovery of independent materials, thereby ‘furnishing a link in the chain of evidence’, the same shall be used by the prosecution.
With respect to the direct use of revelations made under the influence of the drug, the Apex Court has deliberated extensively, referring to a catena of foreign authorities wherein findings of Narcoanalysis test were not allowed as evidence because there was discord among the scientific community with regard to its reliability. Authenticity of Narcoanalysis test has been widely debated, and the Supreme Court is also in accord with the foreign courts and prohibits using findings of the test directly as evidence. In transactional use, subject triggers his prosecution in a different case, other than the one being investigated. Here the findings of the impugned test can be used in two ways; either the prosecution directly relies on the finding and tries to use them in a court or uses the fruits of the finding in the form of materials discovered by virtue of disclosures made under the test. Since direct use of revelations in some other case, is same as using them in the case being investigated, hence, no such use is possible in both cases. Therefore that leaves us with only the derivative use of such revelation.
Concept of derivative use is actually derived from Section 27 of the Evidence Act wherein derivative use of confession made in police custody is allowed. Many-a-times investigating agencies find quite a bit of evidence, but fail to complete the chain required in order to eliminate reasonable doubt and bring about conviction. For instance, in a murder case there are witnesses who have seen the accused exiting the crime scene, and his absence from his residence at the time of commission of crime is also established, but such an overlap in time may be coincidental. If in this situation, the accused, under the influence of the impugned test, ends up telling the place where he has concealed the murder weapon, and subsequently the dragger is discovered, and the blood group of the stains on it matches that of the deceased, then the fruits of such revelation fill the ‘snap in the chain of evidence’ and conviction is possible. This is called derivative use, for which the High Courts have allowed Narcoanalysis to be used as an investigating tool.[vi] When, in the above case, the test being conducted, the accused may not reveal anything to the help of prosecution and hence, using the Narcoanalysis test as an investigating tool is not always successful. There is a possibility that some material discovered under the test might start a fresh chain of evidence when no evidence is available at all. It is also admitted that testimonial compulsion would include direct as well as derivative use, if the information leading to any discovery is proved to have been taken under compulsion.[vii] The Apex Court is of the opinion that the protection under Article 20(3) is wide enough to cover situations like derivative use of Narcoanalysis, and hence held information revealed under Narcoanalysis is offensive to Article 20(3).
Amongst all judgments which the Supreme Court has considered while invalidating Narcoanalysis, three of them require mentioning. The first is that of Raymond Cens,[viii] wherein at the trial, testimony of the findings under Narcoanalysis were admitted attracting a lot of controversy, and hence the Paris Bar Council passed a resolution prohibiting the use of such techniques. It should however be noted, that the findings of Narcoanalysis in the Raymond Cens case were admitted directly and not used as an investigating tool. The Apex Court has referred to several cases on similar lines where the controversy arose only when admission of findings under the influence of drug was insisted upon. Following this are the cases of Townsend v. Sain,[ix]and Horvath v. R.[x]The former was delivered by the US Supreme Court and the latter by the Supreme Court of Canada. They both have sufficient bearing upon the present Judgment because therein Narcoanalysis was held as unconstitutional. In the Townsend case, the US Supreme Court held that a confession induced by administration of drugs is constitutionally inadmissible in a criminal trial. Along the same lines, but a step further, the Court, in the Horvath case held that statements made in a hypnotic state were not voluntary and hence could not be admitted as evidence, and if the post- hypnotic statements related back to the contents of what was said during the hypnotic state, these statements would also be inadmissible. In the Canadian case the Court went on to state that the meaning of voluntariness should not be confined within the boundaries of ‘fear of prejudice’ and ‘hope of advantage’ but should be given a natural meaning. The scope and meaning of expressions such as fear of prejudice and hope of advantage have been dealt with subsequently in greater detail.
‘Fear of Prejudice’ and ‘Hope of Advantage’
When an accused is threatened, the situation is one of choice between alternatives, either one disagreeable to be sure, but still subject to a choice.[xi]For instance, the accused has to choose either to continue undergoing torture or confess, which essentially means there is always a fear of prejudice. Similarly, when any transactional promise such as lesser punishment is made, there is always an option before the accused to make a choice. There exists a hope of advantage. The Apex Court is of the opinion that protection of Article 20(3) should not be confined to the above expressions. Hence the expression “voluntary” cannot be taken to simply mean a “conscious choice”[xii] and it should be given its natural meaning. Nevertheless, it is also true that the precise definition of ‘voluntary’ is not possible, and countries where jurisprudence has passed through a long span of time, in order to define the term ‘voluntary’, have ended up creating clouds over it. The question of voluntariness has long been one which defies absolute definition.[xiii]Moreover the word ‘voluntary’ may be deemed to be somewhat misleading.[xiv] One of the determining factors therefore, is the nature of options available. If one of the options is torturous or luring enough, so as to extract even a false confession, such confession will be hit by Article 20(3).[xv]On the other hand, no such choice is required to be made under Narcoanalysis. Under Narcoanalysis, the subject is not facilitated with a choice to choose the lesser of the two evils. Observations made in the last two lines initiate the need to explore the origins of the doctrine of privilege, dealt with subsequently.
Origin of Doctrine of Privilege
The Supreme Court has agreed that there are competing versions of the historical origin of the ‘doctrine of privilege’.[xvi] Under the first version, the maxim has its origin in protest against the inquisitorial methods of interrogating accused persons, primarily against self-incriminating questions posed by the English common law courts, and the ex-officio oath delivered by the Star Chamber and the High Commissions in England. Under an ex officio oath, the defendant was required to answer all questions posed by the judges and prosecutors during the trial and failure to do so would attract punishments often involving physical torture.[xvii] Both these courts were abolished in 1641 AD. The Judgment further states, that even though the threat of physical torture for remaining silent had been removed after the abolition of the Star Chamber and the High Commissions, the defendant would still face a high risk of conviction if he did not respond to the charges by answering the material questions posed by the judge and the prosecutor.[xviii]The Court has also referred to the landmark judgement of Nandini Satpathy v. P. L. Dani,[xix] highlighting that this monumental right traces its history to the maxim ‘nemo tenetur seipsum tenetur’.[xx] Until the expulsion of the Stuarts from the British throne in 1688, and the erection of additional barriers for the protection of the people against the exercise of arbitrary power, such unjust methods of interrogation were not uncommon even in England. It is important to note that even before the abolition of the Star Chamber and the High Commissions, exclusionary rule was applied since there is always a fear of compelled testimony being false. After the origin of the privilege doctrine, exclusionary rule is applied not just because confession might be false, but also because it is involuntary. The Supreme Court puts forth these two reasons as well, for the application of the exclusionary rule.[xxi]
When Narcoanalysis is used as an investigating tool, and its derivative use furnishes a link in the chain of evidence, the question of falsity is almost negligible, because before any material discovered by virtue of revelations made under the influence of drug is admitted, it has to undergo scrutiny in court. Thus, the determining factor for constitutionality of the impugned test is voluntariness of the revelations made. If the protection of Article 20(3) is really wide then administering the said test is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has agreed with this proposition and held revelations made under the influence of drug as compelled.
The Apex Court also referred to the landmark verdict in Miranda v. Arizona[xxii]. After this judgment, administering a warning to the accused of his right to silence during custodial interrogations and obtaining a voluntary waiver of the prescribed rights, has become a ubiquitous feature in the U.S. criminal justice system. The Apex Court states that the majority decision in Miranda was not a sudden development in U.S. constitutional law. The scope of privilege against self-incrimination had been progressively expanded in several prior decisions.[xxiii]It is the constitutionally entrenched status of the right against self-incrimination, along with earlier verdicts[xxiv]on the same issue, which prompted the Apex Court to deliver this Judgment. How far the Supreme Court is accurate in extending the protection under Article 20(3), is a matter of debate. Criticism of such wide treatment finds support in Wigmore on Evidence. Prof. Wigmore argues that the exclusionary rule is not intended to protect the guilty. The very purpose of criminal justice system is ascertainment of truth and protection of the innocent. He further states that if medical or psychic science, represented by an accord amongst experts in the scientific community, establishes the trustworthiness of a confession induced by artificial means known to such science, then confession so induced should be admissible.[xxv]Since there is no sufficient consensus in the scientific community, admission of such confession is unacceptable. But when there is no impairment to the right against self-incrimination, provided the consensus exists, there is no harm in using them as an investigating tool. It has already been stated earlier that using this test as an investigating tool carries negligible chances of bringing false conviction. It is also required to note that such kind of investigating tool does not only find culprits, but also helps in proving innocence.
The Apex Court has erred in extending the protection of Article 20(3) to such an extent, when the very origin of privilege doctrine was due to torturous methods adopted in interrogation and impending risk of conviction for remaining silent. It is indeed true that right against Self-incrimination has undergone manifold progress in all democratic jurisdictions, but at the same time it is also a glaring truth that new methods of committing crime and rise of terrorism often leaves law enforcement agencies unaided.
Other relevant issues
The Apex Court has shown considerable concern over frequent resort to such tests, which is likely to make investigating agencies lethargic. Allowing Narcoanalysis as an investigation tool in situations where there is no way-out for the investigating agencies, and with the permission of the court would hardly hamper the diligence of investigating agencies.
A very curious situation has also been highlighted by the Supreme Court that it is plausible for the investigators to obtain statements from individuals by threat of administering any of these tests. The person could possibly make self-incriminating statements on account of apprehensions of these techniques extracting the truth. The Court has refrained from making any conclusive remark on this aspect in the entire judgment. In Pinter v. State,[xxvi] the Supreme Court of Mississippi admitted the confession of the accused who was informed of the existence of a machine having the capacity to read his mind and produce other psychological reactions. In fear of this he confessed; which was challenged as incompetent to be sustained. While admitting the confession, the Court observed that “...it would seem that his fear was not of the machine but of its capacity to elicit truth. It was therefore a fear of the truth and its consequences”. In other words, the person not volunteering for Narcoanalysis in fact fears the probability of speaking the truth which is what curtails his free will, and not any external physical or mental pressure put on him.[xxvii]
Thus far in this case comment, one aspect has been consciously avoided, that is, the discretion of the accused to choose between speaking and remaining silent; the Right to Silence under Article 20(3). Right to silence is subject to limitations in some countries.[xxviii] In UK and Australia, the silence of the accused may lead to adverse inference. Though it is argued that legal structure and constitutional safeguards in those countries are different from that of India, concerns have been shown in India as well about inviolability of the right to silence.[xxix]Lastly, the Court points out that in an ordinary confession, the accused always has a liberty to revert back from his confession but no such option is available in case of Narcoanalysis. This unreasonable reasoning forces us to wonder whether the basic purpose of criminal justice system is for making false confessions or apprehending culprits.
Article 21 and Human Rights
Article 21 is the cornerstone of the constitution and no act can be validated by its infringement. The landmark judgment of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,[xxx] prescribed that any act abridging Article 21 must be fair, just and reasonable. The use of Narcoanalysis has come under undeniable scrutiny since it may affect this Fundamental Right of the individual. The Judgment puts forth a detailed discussion of the same.
The first right discussed is that of the Right to Privacy protected under Article 21. Although in Kharak Singh,[xxxi] such right was upheld as a Fundamental Right, several judgments hence forth have provided that such right is not absolute but subject to reasonable restrictions.[xxxii]Subsequent judgments have curtailed this right in view of prevention of crime, disorder, and protection of rights and freedom of others.[xxxiii] The procedure for use of Narcoanalysis indeed seems to violate this fundamental right; however the method by which it is carried out and its inherent purpose justifies its use in the form of reasonable restrictions. The procedure for Narcoanalysis involves induction of the accused into a ‘hypnotic stage’.[xxxiv] Moreover, this process is carried out in the presence of a forensic psychologist, an anesthesiologist, a psychiatrist, a general physician and other medical staff, ensuring the safety of the process. In brief, the process is conducted in the presence of experts who are well trained in this procedure. Furthermore, the fact that the questioning is done by a forensic psychologist and not a police officer is of great significance as it reduces the chances of misuse of this procedure by the police force. Furthermore the practice followed by the High Courts in their erstwhile judgments permitting the use of Narcoanalysis was that, they had done so only after the permission of the Judicial Magistrate has been sought.[xxxv]At the same time, it is also pertinent to note that any law carries with it some scope of misuse[xxxvi].
The inherent limitations of Narcoanalysis are the absence of absolute success, possibility of revelation of irrelevant information, possibility of misuse etc. Therefore, the Judgment, as a word of caution states that the use of Narcoanalysis may lead to the accused revealing information that is personal in nature and irrelevant to the case as he has no control over his speech during this process. Thus, it becomes important to understand the need for Narcoanalysis and the purpose for which it is used. Firstly, it is the last resort, implemented only when the investigating authorities have reached a dead end. The Right to Privacy has never been looked upon as a right in its absolute sense[xxxvii] and the society has the right to be protected against the criminal,[xxxviii] and all of the society's rights are manifestly superior to those of the criminal.[xxxix] Therefore, such an intrusion is warranted in the light of protection of its subjects by the State.[xl]
The other impediment to the use of Narcoanalysis is the protection of Human Rights. Article 21 in its scope of personal liberty encompasses within itself the protection of ‘bodily integrity and dignity of person who are in custodial environments’. In Coralie Mullin v. Union Territory of Delhi,[xli] the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that “…any form of torture or cruel, inhuman treatment would be offensive to human dignity…be prohibited by Article 21”.In spite of its alleged involuntary nature which has been considerably discussed earlier which may excite the question of Human Rights, the procedure as such cannot be called cruel, or inhuman. The judgment refers to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,[xlii] the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,[xliii] and the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.[xliv] However, if the definition provided in Article 1 of the last Convention is carefully read, it is rather difficult to imagine Narcoanalysis as fitting within its folds. Firstly, the definition speaks of severe physical or mental pain. In Narcoanalysis, physical pain is negligible. As for mental suffering, the reasoning that realization of the consequences of the possibility of making incriminatory statements results in mental suffering of the individual as aforementioned seems unsteady. On the other hand, as per the verdict, Narcoanalysis is conducted in a catena of cases,[xlv] by experts and the accused is continuously monitored during the entire process. The accused is examined before conducting the test so as to ensure that he is capable of undergoing it. The second part of the definition is true for any kind of interrogation process i.e. it is used for extracting information. The question of inherent dignity of an individual is however one of far greater importance. Numerous atrocities have been committed on Prisoners of War and those merely accused of crime attracting the paramount need for enforcing Human Rights in the process of interrogation. However, the fact that in earlier circumstances the practice of conducting Narcoanalysis was with the permission of a judicial authority, the very nature of Narcoanalysis with regard to the amount of physical and mental pain that was inflicted along with the procedure as mention above greatly reduces the possibility of misuse and makes it difficult to consider Narcoanalysis on the same plane as third degree method of interrogation.
The last right allegedly affected by the procedure is the Right to Fair Trial. The Judgment has raised several concerns with regard to the same. First is the absence of legal advice during the time of questioning. However, the interrogation that takes place during Narcoanalysis is markedly different from the regular interrogation. The questioning is not by a police officer and thus any evidence adduced cannot be admitted in the court of law. Further as mentioned several times before, the purpose of Narcoanalysis is to provide a break in the investigation when all other means have been exhausted. Another concern raised is the questionable reliability of this process being incompatible with the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The fact that Narcoanalysis is not a fool-proof method is not denied; however the concern of ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’ would not arise unless the same is directly admitted in court. Since the evidence adduced from Narcoanalysis is merely used as an investigating tool, this concern is also frustrated. The last concern raised by the court is that however of considerable import; the use of Narcoanalysis may affect the parity between the prosecution and the defence. In this regard, it is pertinent to state that the very concept of fair trial is a triangulation of interests of the accused, the victim and the society and the interests of the society cannot be treated as persona non grata.[xlvi]The Supreme Court has also held that the rules and procedures involved in a fair trial are continually in a state of flux, changing according to the needs and exigencies of the situation, the crime, and those involved etc.[xlvii] Though the right of the accused stands to be infringed by the use of Narcoanalysis, the same must be weighed against the right of the victim and the society to receive justice. The fear that the process of Narcoanalysis unduly affecting the parity between the prosecution and the defence is thereby vitiated and if present is justified by virtue of the larger interests of the community.
Conclusion
While the Apex Court is of the opinion that protection of Article 20(3) is wide enough to cover situations like derivative use of Narcoanalysis, it also seems acceptable that in light of new and monstrous crimes protection of Article 20(3) should not be entrenched too far. In case of Narcoanalysis there is no choice of choosing between two evils. Essence of any criminal justice system is to bring criminals to justice and Narcoanalysis facilitates the same especially in light of the fact that there are negligible chances of any conviction being false, brought at the instance of Narcoanalysis. It is submitted that human rights today have infused into all democratic societies and its reaches are far beyond what the farmers of these rights would have thought of. Nevertheless, share of every right should not be more than what it deserves. When the very origin of the doctrine of privilege was due to inhumane methods of interrogation, it seems unwarranted to give a very wide interpretation to Article 20(3).
In conclusion it is admitted that the procedure of Narcoanalysis requires much more refinement before it can reach perfection and be used without concern for the safety and rights of the individual. However, what is required are Guidelines similar to those provided for the polygraph test,[xlviii] and rules regarding the implementation of this test,[xlix] rather than declaring the use of the test to be void in law. Denial of Narcoanalysis as a tool of investigation merely for fear of its misuse will be a blatant disregard of the rights of the society as against that of the accused.
[i] Students National law University, Jodhpur, piyush.nlu@gmail.com, puloma.m@gmail.com
[ii] Article: C.W. Muechlberge, Interrogation Under Drug Influence. The So-Called “Truth Serum” Technique, The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, Vol. 42, No. 4 (Nov-Dec 1951) pp. 513-528)
[iii] Article: Robinson O. Everett, New Procedures of Scientific Investigation and the Protection of the Accused’s Rights, Duke Law Journal, Vol. 1959, No. 1 (1959), pp. 32-77
[iv] AIR 2010 SC 1974
[v]Nandini Satpathy v. P L Dani, (1978) 2 SCC 424
[vi]Smt. Selvi and Ors. v. State by Koramangala Police Station, 2004 (7) Kar LJ 501; Santokben Sharmanbhai Jadeja v. State of Gujarat, 2008 Cri LJ 68
[vii]Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani, AIR 1978 SC 1025
[viii] Para 48
[ix]372 US 293 (1963)
[x][1979] 44 C.C.C. (2d) 385
[xi] 3 Wigmore, Evidence
[xii] 3 Wigmore, Evidence
[xiii] R v. Harz, (1966) 3 WLR 1241
[xiv] Harlan J. dissenting in Miranda
[xv]Note that falsity of a statement is not the only determining factor to attract Article 20(3), voluntariness is another important factor.
[xvi] Para 85
[xvii] Para 85
[xviii] Para 88
[xix] (1978) 2 SCC 424
[xx]‘A man cannot represent himself guilty’.
[xxi] Para 91
[xxii]384 US 436 (1966)
[xxiii] Para 106; the Court is basically discussing the stage of protection against self-incrimination.
[xxiv] Townsend v. Sain, 372 US 293 (1963), Horvath v. R, [1979] 44 C.C.C. (2d) 385
[xxv] 3 Wigmore, Evidence
[xxvi]203 Miss. 344, 34 So.2d 723
[xxvii] See Commonwealth v. Jones, 341 Pa. 541, 19 A.2d 389 (1941)
[xxviii]Especially Australia and UK, 180th report of the Law Commission of India
[xxix] Dr. L.M. Singhvi Constitution of India, (Modern Law Publishers, Nagpur, 2004) 13th Edn.,
p. 906-907
[xxx] AIR 1978 SC 597
[xxxi]Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 1295
[xxxii]Govind v. State of M.P., AIR 1975 SC 1378
[xxxiii]‘X’ v. Hospital ‘Z’, (1998) 8 SCC 296
[xxxiv]This is the second of four stages that follow the use of this drug depending on the concentration in which it is used and the rate of its administration.
[xxxv]Supra note 1
[xxxvi]People’s Union for Civil Liberties and Anr. v. Union of India, AIR 2004 SC 456
[xxxvii]State of Maharashtra v. Madhukar Narayan Mardikar, AIR 1991 SC 207
[xxxviii]Whether the suspect is innocent or guilty cannot be ascertained beforehand, and no one knows the truth better than does the suspect himself. It, therefore, stands to reason, that where there is a safe and humane measure existing to evoke the truth from the consciousness of the suspect, that society is entitled to have the truth cf. Dr. R.E. House’s address at the First Annual Meeting of the Eastern Society of Anesthetists in the year 1925
[xxxix]‘ salus populi est suprema lex’
[xl]Govind v. State of M.P., AIR 1975 SC 1378
[xli] AIR 1981 SC 746
[xlii] Article 5
[xliii] Article 7
[xliv] Articles 1 and 16
[xlv]Smt. Selvi and Ors. v. State by Koramangala Police Station, 2004 (7) Kar LJ 501; Santokben Sharmanbhai Jadeja v. State of Gujarat, 2008 Cri LJ 68: before subjecting an accused to Narco-analysis Test, his/her medical fitness will be ascertained and thereafter only accused will be subjected to Narco-analysis Test. Furthermore the dosage level required to take a person to the hypnotic stage is found to be 3-4 times smaller than those required for stages beyond.
[xlvi]K Anbazhagan v. Superintendent of Police, AIR 2004 SC 524
[xlvii]Ibid
[xlviii]Guidelines for the Administration of Polygraph Test (Lie Detector Test) on an Accused by the National Human Rights Commission
[xlix]In this regard an amendment can be proposed for express inclusion of Narcoanalysis in the Code of Criminal Procedure along with rules regarding its implementation so as to prevent its misuse.
